Created Sunday, Dec 1st 2024 14:37Z, last updated Wednesday, Dec 3rd 2025 18:17Z
An ANZ Air New Zealand Airbus A320-200N, registration ZK-NHA performing flight
NZ-249 from Wellington (New Zealand) to Sydney,NS (Australia) with 142 passengers and 6 crew, was enroute at FL360 about 280nm northwest of Wellington when one of the engines (PW1127G) down, the crew drifted the aircraft down to FL230 and diverted to Auckland (New Zealand) where the aircraft landed on Auckland's runway 05R safely about 90 minutes after departure.
The aircraft was still on the ground in Auckland about 10 hours after landing.
The airline reported about one hour into the flight the crew experienced an issue with one of the engines, followed procedures, shut the engine down and diverted to Auckland.
On Dec 3rd 2025 New Zealand's TAIC released their interim report reporting the engine shut down without human action summarizing: "Interim factual report shows that damage to a cockpit overhead panel for control of engine fires can cause self-activation of a switch that shuts down its designated engine. Similar events have occurred internationally. " As result of a safety recommendation by TAIC EASA have issued Airworthiness Directive AD 2025-0234 on Oct 23rd 2025.
The TAIC summarized the sequence of events:
The aeroplane was established in the cruise at 36,000 feet (ft) for approximately 15 minutes when, at 1631, a master caution audible tone and warning light were triggered. The captain noted that the number two engine indications on the engine instrument display showed that the engine was rolling back. In interview, the first officer recalled that their first indication that something was wrong was loud clicking noises from the panel behind their seat, which they considered could be indicative of a system power change.
The flight crew carried out the engine shutdown checklist for the number two engine as prompted by the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM). The captain initiated the driftdown procedure while they both discussed, then actioned, a diversion to Auckland and declared a mayday. The flight crew completed several checklists then spoke to the cabin crew and passengers and informed them of the diversion to Auckland.
The aeroplane landed safely at Auckland with no injuries to passengers or crew and no damage to the aeroplane.
The flight was met in Auckland by the duty management pilot, a union support pilot and an engineer. The people entering the flight deck noticed that the fire push button switch (PB-SW) for the number two engine on the overhead fire panel was in the activated position and pointed this out to the flight crew. Neither pilot recalled activating the fire switch and none of the checklists used by the crew required activation of this fire switch.
The TAIC reported with reference to the Portoguese report by GPIAF concerning an event on an A321 in 2023:
The report also identified that Airbus was aware of three previous events involving uncommanded fire switch activation.
The Commission contacted the French safety body Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA) to obtain details of the three previous incidents. They confirmed that two events occurred in 2016 and one in 2021. The common factor in these events, which aligned with the incident investigated in the Portuguese report, was that when the fire panel was subsequently examined it was noted that there was damage to the fire panel unit and the pin locking system within one of the fire switches.
The GPIAAF report detailed examination of the fire panel and fire switches for their investigation, carried out in Paris (France) by Safran Electronics & Defense (Safran ED), the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of the fire panel. Safran ED’s report concluded ‘The fire panel has been damaged by mishandling, causing external and internal damage, and resulting of randomness disengagement of the pushbutton (PBSW)’. They observed that ‘the damage to the unit resulted in bending of the PB-SW retaining pin’ and therefore reducing ‘the retention security of the switch in the latched position’ (GPIAAF, 2024, p8).
The TAIC summarized the fire panel examination:
The fire panel was removed from the aeroplane under the supervision of a Commission investigator and taken to Safran ED in France for examination. The examination was conducted by Safran ED at Roissy (France) and overseen by a Commission investigator.
Safran ED staff were immediately able to identify external damage to the fire switch guard that surrounds the fire switch and deformation on the front panel. The retention pin within the fire switch was misaligned by 2.73° (tolerance specification is +/- 1°) and there was evidence of chamfer on the pin. Safran ED concluded that the damage to the panel was very likely caused when the fire panel was dropped at some stage.
