Created Wednesday, Jun 3rd 2026 20:01Z, last updated Wednesday, Jun 3rd 2026 20:01Z
A Bangkok Airways Aerospatiale ATR-72-500, registration HS-PGL performing flight
PG-266 from Krabi to Koh Samui (Thailand) with 68 passengers and 4 crew, skidded off runway 35 at Koh Samui (6750 feet/2060 meters asphalt) and collided with an old unused control tower at around 14:30 local (07:30Z). The captain was killed, the co-pilot and 6 passengers received serious injuries and were brought to hospitals, 27 people received minor injuries (bruises and shock) and were treated on scene. The airplane received substantial damage to the nose section.
The airline believes, heavy rain at the time of the landing contributed to the accident. The airline confirms the death of one pilot and four serious injuries amongst the passengers with two others also being delivered to hospital with minor injuries. An investigation team has arrived at the accident site.
Authorities in Samui report, the captain of the flight has been killed in the accident, the co-pilot and six foreign passengers (4 UK, 1 Swiss, 1 Italian) received serious injuries (broken legs/bones) and were brought to local hospitals, 27 other people were suffering from bruises and shock and were treated at the airport. Emergency services managed to free the co-pilot, who was trapped in the aircraft. The co-pilot is in intense care in critical condition with internal injuries in addition to the leg injuries.
The Transport Minister said briefing Thailand's cabinet about first results of the investigation, that the accident was caused by the weather. A sudden wind gust hit the airplane after touch down.
Passengers said, that the approach was very windy and stormy. The airplane touched down but bounced off again and went out of control. When the airplane touched down a second time, the airplane veered left towards the grass.
In Jun 2026 the final report dated Dec 24th 2025 surfaced concluding the probable causes of the accident were:
- This accident may have been caused by the weather conditions at Samui International Airport when the aircraft was landing, with a surface wind direction 300 degrees and gusts between 25 and 35 knots, combined with the pilot did not go around when conducting a non-stabilized approach.
- When the automatic “SINK RATE” warning sounded, the pilot did not perform a go around in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Chapter 2/Page 70, Rev. 1-22/07/09, under the Stabilization Policy during the landing.
Contributing Factors
- The co-pilot did not warn the pilot to go around when automatic warning "sink rate" sounded when conducting a non-stabilized approach.
- The meteorological office building's location was an obstacle in the transitional surface, causing the aircraft to veer off the runway and crash into the meteorological office building causing this accident.
The TAAIC (Thailand's Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission) analysed:
- Based on the maintenance histories, the aircraft, engines, and various systems appeared to have been properly maintained in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) (now the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand; CAAT).
- The aircraft had valid Certificate of Airworthiness and Certificate of Registration.
- Weather information at Samui International Airport as the aircraft operated and landed, there were a surface wind direction of 300 degrees, gusts 25-35 knots, visibility was 4 kilometers, and a light thunderstorm.
- Samui International Airport, which was classified as a Code 4C Non-Instrument Runway, according to the AIP Thailand: VTSM AD 2-4 10 DEC 08 topic VTSM 2.12 Runway. The runway strips had a strip of 50 meters on each side, measured from the runway center line throughout the length of 2,165 meters, which did not comply with Recommendation on ICAO Annex 14 Volume I Aerodrome Design and Operations Fifth Edition July 2009, which stated that a strip including a noninstrument runway should extend on each side of the center line of the runway and its extened center line throughout the length of the strip, to a distance of at least 75 meters on each side.
- The meteorological office building was 80 meters from the runway center line on the left side of runway 35, 30 meters from the runway strips and 10 meters high.
Based on ICAO Annex 14 Volume I Aerodrome Design and Operations Fifth Edition, July 2009. Table 14-1showed the dimensions and slopes of obstacle limitation surfaces. Meteorological office buildings must be no taller than 4. 29 meters, as specified in Appendix 3.As a result, the meteorological office building was considered an obstacle.
- At 2:09:50 p.m., there was an automatic call out when the aircraft passed 500 feet, and at 2:10:06 p.m., there was a "sink rate" warning sound because of the excessive descent rate from the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), indicating that the aircraft was not on the appropriate flight path, which was a non-stabilized approach. However, the pilot did not go around because he believed thathe could correct the aircraft back to its normal flight path.
Metars (the airport has not released any new Metars after the accident so far):
VTSM 040700Z 29015KT 9000 FEW020TCU SCT120 BKN300 31/25 Q1007 A2974 TCU-NW
VTSM 040600Z 29012KT 9999 FEW020 SCT120 32/25 Q1007 A2976
VTSM 040400Z 24004KT 9999 FEW020 SCT120 31/24 Q1008 A2979
VTSM 040300Z 27008KT 9999 FEW020 SCT120 SCT300 31/24 Q1008 A2979
VTSM 040200Z 27010KT 9999 FEW020 SCT120 30/24 Q1008 A2979
Map (Courtesy Google Earth):
Related Flight:
PG266,
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