Created Friday, Dec 17th 2021 15:38Z, last updated Friday, Dec 17th 2021 15:38Z
A Budapest Air Service Embraer EMB-120 Brasilia, registration HA-FAL performing flight
W2-692 from Pori to Helsinki (Finland) with 6 passengers and 3 crew, was enroute at FL170 when the aircraft encountered light icing prompting the captain to request to descend to FL150. After being cleared to descend the captain retarded both power levers and began the descent. While monitoring the engine parameters the crew noticed that the right engine torque and fuel flow had dropped below normal, the captain advanced both power levers to increase the right hand engine, the engine hwoever did not react. The crew concluded they had an engine failure, shut the engine down, declared emergency and continued to Helsinki for a safe landing on runway 15.
The Finnish Onnettomuustutkintakeskus (AIBF) released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
1. The engine power loss resulted from a P3 line failure.
Conclusion: An engine-mounted HMU establishes the minimum and maximum
limits of fuel flow to the engine as a function of P3 and the power lever position. After the loss of P3 supply, power lever movements have no effect on fuel flow to, and the power output of, an engine.
2. The pilots shut down the affected engine and completed the flight on a single engine.
Conclusion: Twin-engined passenger airplanes are certified for safe operation in the event of the failure of one engine. The performance of one engine is sufficient during all phases of the flight.
3. The CVR did not retain the pilots’ conversations during the flight because the CVR was not appropriately secured after the incident.
Conclusion: Because CVR data provides essential information for safety investigation, a CVR should be secured after an incident to prevent overwriting.
The AIBF wrote with respect to the engine failure:
An examination by a company mechanic revealed that the power loss had resulted from the failure of the P3 line in the right engine.
An HMU6 mounted on each engine establishes the minimum and maximum limits of fuel flow to the engine as a function of P37 and the power lever position. The HMU uses P3 as the primary parameter to establish fuel flow limits. Due to a P3 line failure on the incident flight, the HMU scheduled fuel flow to the right engine to the minimum, and as a result engine power decayed close to idle, but no warning indication was received in the cockpit. After the P3 line failure, movements of the right power lever had no effect on fuel flow to, and the power output of, the right engine.
The aircraft was declared airworthy after the company mechanic had rectified the fault and an engine test run was carried out.
Related Flight:
W2692, Twitter:
#W2692,
Flex Flight News
