Created Thursday, Nov 26th 2020 21:59Z, last updated Tuesday, Jan 13th 2026 20:39Z
An EAT Leipzig Airbus A300-600 freighter on behalf of DHL, registration D-AEAI performing flight QY-841 from Brussels (Belgium) to Vitoria,SP (Spain), was accelerating for takeoff from Brussels' runway 25R at about 18:11L (17:11Z) when the crew rejected takeoff at high speed (approx. 150 knots over ground). The aircraft slowed and stopped on the runway about 360 meters/1200 feet short of the runway end (about 2920 meters/9600 feet after the start of the takeoff roll), however, was disabled with deflated main tyres. Emergency services responded and attended to the aircraft.
The runway returned to service at around 04:31L (03:31Z) about 10:20 hours after the occurrence.
The airport reported "Following a technical incident runway 25R has not been available. Runway 19 is used for departures and runway 25L for landings."
Belgium's AAIU opened an investigation into the occurrence.
The airline reported the crew encountered difficulties to takeoff prompting them to reject takeoff during rotation when the nose gear had already become airborne. At that point the crew checked their airspeed, it was still slow enough to reject takeoff. Due to the heavy braking 8 tyres deflated. The cause of the problems to become airborne are under investigation, however, it certainly was no problem with the cargo.
On Dec 3rd 2020 the Belgium AAIU stated the crew reported a normal acceleration of the aircraft during the takeoff roll. During rotation the nose did pitch up, however, the aircraft did not lift off. The crew rejected takeoff, applied reverse thrust and brought the aircraft to a stop between taxiways A6 and A7. The occurrence was rated a serious incident and is being investigated.
On Jan 28th 2021 Germany's BFU reported in their November bulletin that the aircraft was accelerating for takeoff when the crew felt vibrations just prior to V1. The aircraft increased pitch upon rotation, but did not lift off prompting the captain to reject takeoff. The aircraft came to a stand still on the runway, as result of the heat developed by the brakes all main tyres deflated. The BFU assists the investigations in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 representing the state of registry.
On Jan 29th 2021 The Aviation Herald received information, that SOP at the operator require to turn the trim to +1.0 trim units (1 unit nose up) after landing. In the morning before the incident flight maintenance worked on the aircraft and rolled the trim to -1.1 units (1.1 units nose down). The load sheet computed a trim setting of +1.1 units for departure. While the load sheet used the +/- notation, the trim itself only shows UP and DN, both +1.1 and -1.1 units are within the green band of the trim settings for takeoff, the crew thus missed that the trim was at -1.1 units instead of the required +1.1 units and experienced a very high pitch force during takeoff rotation. The pitch trim is only checked once during working the pre-departure and takeoff checklists, shortly before V1 the crew experienced vibrations drawing the crew attention to the engine parameters. Being above V1 and Vr there was time pressure in decision making. Post non-flight examination did not find any technical anomaly. In simulations it was determined that all pilots exposed to the simulation felt significantly higher pitch forces in this scenario, most crews were not aware of the effects of the wrong trim setting.
Belgium's AAIU released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
- No technical anomaly was found
- Abnormal feel in the aircraft control column upon rotation, as experienced by the captain, was due to an inadequate pitch trim setting.
- The pitch trim wheel setting should have been 1.0 nose-up after last flight but was changed and left to 1.1 nose-down during maintenance actions in between the flights.
- However, procedures in the AMM require placing the pitch trim control wheel in neutral position after having performed operational tests (incorrect maintenance action).
- This was not seen during the ‘after start’ checklist due to a misreading of the trim wheel (mis-recognition).
- The fact that it must be set to 1.0 nose-up after every flight may have unconsciously led to the assumption that the wheel was correctly positioned when the Pilot Flying saw it near ‘1’, without further checking whether this was nose-up or nose-down (expectancy).
Findings as to risk factors
- The decision to reject take-off after decision speed V1 (decision-making – incorrect action selection)
Other findings
- The aircraft was airborne for 1 second upon the decision to abort.
- The taking-off of the aircraft was fully feasible, however a stronger force needed to be exerted on the column.
Related NOTAMs:
A3555/20 NOTAMN
Q) EBBU/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A /000/999/5054N00429E005
A) EBBR B) 2011261730 C) 2011261815
E) RWY 07L/25R CLSD DUE TO WIP, NO PPR
A3556/20 NOTAMR A3555/20
Q) EBBU/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A /000/999/5054N00429E005
A) EBBR B) 2011261800 C) 2011262015
E) RWY 07L/25R CLSD
A3558/20 NOTAMR A3556/20
Q) EBBU/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A /000/999/5054N00429E005
A) EBBR B) 2011261920 C) 2011270200
E) RWY 07L/25R CLSD
