Created Friday, May 3rd 2024 20:54Z, last updated Thursday, Feb 27th 2025 17:20Z
An Iraqi Airways Boeing 737-800, registration YI-ASI performing flight
IA-113 from Najaf (Iraq) to Tehran Imam Khomeini (Iran), was cleared to land on Tehran's runway 11R however touched down on closed runway 11L at 16:40L (13:10Z). The aircraft rolled out without further incident coming to a brief stop about 1920 meters/6300 feet down the runway, turned around by about 135 degrees and vacated the runway via the high speed turnoff for runway 29R.
According to information The Aviation Herald received the crew was used to landing on runway 29R and became confused when the runway was switched to 11R. Runway 11L/29R was closed and NOTAMed closed for works in progress, workers were working on the runway shoulders. There were no injuries and no damage.
Iran's AAIB opened an investigation.
On May 8th 2024 The Aviation Herald was able to receive the preliminary report by Iran's AAIB in both Persian and English summarizing the sequence of events:
The flight was cleared by radar controller to follow standard arrival chart-instrument STAR 1-2, SAV 1R. subsequently, the pilot in command announced FL070 and asked tower controller’s clearance for approach continuance. The controller issued clearance to continue approach and reminded the pilot in command about separation from wake turbulence of the previous heavy traffic before landing. The pilot in command announced that he would keep FL070 and would need to make an orbit, out of the present position in order to lose height, but the controller asked him to descend as profile, and the pilot read it back.
At 13:09 UTC, the tower controller issued landing clearance on RWY11R, acknowledging the pilot about 120-degree 18 knots wind. The pilot in commend read back first “RWY11R” and then immediately “RWY11L”, but the controller did not realize the last wrong readback and the flight landed on the unauthorized RWY11L, which was closed for construction work, and entered the taxiway before reaching to construction area.
On Feb 27th 2025 Iran's AAIB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
The cockpit crew failed to have enough attention to NOTAM, ATIS and the tower controller’s landing clearance attention and focused on loose altitude only while approaching to the airport.
Contributing factors
- The Airliner dispatch operations officer did not provide a brief notice of the NOTAM to the Cockpit crew before this flight.
- Many consecutive runway closures and openings during construction period of runway.
The AAIB analysed:
On 01 May 2024 between 13:06 UTC and 13:14 UTC, the following 4 arrival flights were respectively on approaching sequence at OIIE: IRA718 as the 1st one, IAW113 as the 2nd one, AMW221 as the 3rd one, and QSM2142 as the 4th one.
At 12:55:29, IAW113 while descending 250, called Tehran approach section and APP cleared flight level 120 follow SAV 2R approach chart without specifying runway in use. Then on 12:59:45, it was cleared for 8000 ft.
At 13:06, IR718 called OIIE tower control and was cleared to land on RWY11R, Then IAW113 called the tower announcing its 7000 ft height asked the controller to confirm its approach and the controller cleared it to continue without specifying Runway in use.
Due to its high altitude, IAW113 requested for ORBIT to lose its height but the controller denied it by considering other traffic, cleared it to descend on profile.
At 13:08 UTC, IR718 landed on RWY11R and at the same time AMW221 about 13NM from final called the tower and was cleared to continue its approach.
At 13:09 UTC, when IRA718 left RWY11R, the controller cleared IAW113 to land on RWY11R and the pilot read it back first correctly (ONE ONE RIGHT) and while repeating , he read back wrong runway (Iraqi ONE ONE LEFT) and then its callsign (IRAQI ONE ONE THREE), but the controller didn’t recognize the wrong readback.
At 13:10:26, IAW113 landed on the closed RWY 11L. Afterwards, the controller informed IAW113 of landing on the unauthorized RWY 11L and instructed it to hold its position. Ensuring that IAW113 had fully stopped, the controller cleared respectively AMW221 and QSM2142 to land on RWY 11R. After landing of the two other flights, IAW113 was instructed to proceed to the SALAM parking area.
According to the related evidences, the NOTAM of closed RWY 29L had been issued by Iranian Airports & Air Navigation Company, in addition, closed RWY 11L had been informed on the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) frequency. but despite of this information, it seems that the pilot’s focus on descending to lose altitude, caused him to misunderstand the controller’s clearance for runway 11R, so that the pilot first read back the clearance correctly but immediately read back wrongly the closed runway, which was not realized by the controller. In such situation, using the word “Correction” can reduce the possibility of misunderstanding of communication between controllers and pilots.
ICAO DOC 9432 (Manual of Radiotelephony) describes the transmitting techniques that will assist in ensuring that transmitted speech is clear and satisfactory received (para 2.2.1), which includes “maintain an even rate of speech not exceeding 100 words per minute”.
In this case, the landing clearance readback by IAW113 (at 13:09:02 UTC), the pilot speech message contains 13 words that are heard in 4 seconds and is equal to the rate of speech of 196 word per minute (nearly two times that describe in transmitting techniques by ICAO radiotelephony manual). In addition, in this read back message coincidentally there are three expressions of “one one . . .” which may increase the probability of the controller’s misunderstanding of readback error. On the other hand, the controller’s attention to the other traffic may also contributed to his misunderstanding.
According to OIIE NOTAMs, runway 11L had been under construction for a while, during which consecutive opening/closure and issuing several NOTAMs in this matter increases the possibility of cockpit errors and landing on the closed or uncleared runway. Therefore, shortening the construction period will reduce the possibility of such events or their consequences.
Related NOTAM:
A1459/24 NOTAMN
Q) OIIX/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/
A) OIIE B) 2404240400 C) 2405201430
D) DLY / 0400 -1430
E) RWY 11L/29R CLSD BTN TWY N AND Y DUE TO WIP,
REMAINING PART OF RWY 11L/29R BTN TWY Z AND C USABLE FOR TAX.
Related Flight:
IA113,
Iraqi Airways News
