Created Thursday, Jun 10th 2021 20:54Z, last updated Thursday, Jun 10th 2021 20:54Z
A Jazz de Havilland Dash 8-300, registration C-GNON performing flight QK-8842/AC-8842 from Montreal,QC (Canada) to Hartford,CT (USA), was enroute at FL220 nearing the top of descent when smoke developed in the cockpit, then the windshield cracked. The crew descended the aircraft to 10,000 feet and continued to Hartford for a safe landing about 35 minutes later.

The airline reported smoke in the cockpit and a cracked windshield, the crew therefore requested emergency services on stand by for the arrival.

The occrrence aircraft is still on the ground in Hartford about 27 hours after landing.

On Jan 7th 2020 the Canadian TSB reported the flight crew observed smoke and fire emanating from the upper left corner of the first officer's windshield. The fire was extinguished, the crew declared emergency. The aircraft landed safely in Hartford. There were no injuries, the aircraft sustained minor damage. The US NTSB have opened an investigation.

On Jun 10th 2021 the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable cause of incident was:

The arcing failure of the windshield heat L2 power wire on the right windshield due to unknown reasons.

The NTSB analysed:

While on descent to the destination airport, an in-flight fire occurred at the right windshield terminal block. The flight crew put on oxygen masks and smoke goggles, extinguished the fire, and landed without incident.

The fire damage was concentrated in an area between the upper edge of the terminal block and the lower edge of the windshield gasket where the L2 power wire was routed. The L2 power wire was melted through in this area but remained intact on either side, indicating an arcing failure of the L2 power wire. The damage and melting precluded determination of whether there was any pre-existing damage to the L2 power wire before the incident.

Examination of the windshield revealed that it had been installed on the airplane about 5 years before the incident, which was less than the 8.2-year average life reported by the windshield manufacturer.

The windshield exhibited minor evidence of moisture ingression into the laminate around the edges and minor erosion of the exterior hump seal that did not contribute to the event.

Review of the maintenance records showed that the operator was in compliance with all of the company and airplane manufacturer’s recommended inspections. The operator had performed the mandated inspections required by Airworthiness Directive (AD) but the application of Humiseal to the power terminals had not been completed, therefore, the operator was not in compliance with the AD. The missing Humiseal did not contribute to the event. The most recent inspection, which showed no discrepancies, occurred about 6 weeks prior to the incident.

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