Created Tuesday, Jan 27th 2026 11:45Z, last updated Tuesday, Jan 27th 2026 11:45Z
A Jetstar Airbus A321-200, registration VH-OYF performing flight
JQ-38 from Denpasar (Indonesia) to Sydney,NS (Australia) with 234 passengers and 8 crew, was on final approach to Sydney's runway 16R when the aircraft floated for a prolonged period in right cross wind and drifted to the left of the center line, the captain (pilot monitoring) instructed a go around, the first officer (pilot flying) complied and initiated a go around. The captain however inadvertently manipulated the side stick so that simultaneous control inputs occurred on both side sticks. An aural alert "Dual Input" occurred, the captain took control of the aircraft. In the subsequent pre-occupation the flaps were retracted out of sequence, however, without exceedances of the flight envelope. The aircraft positioned for another approach to runway 16R and landed without further incident about 15 minutes later.
On Jan 27th 2026 the ATSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:
Contributing factors
- During the landing after crossing the threshold, the first officer’s control inputs resulted in a lateral deviation from the runway centreline during a prolonged float.
- After calling for a go-around, the captain inadvertently manipulated their sidestick while the first officer was the pilot flying, which resulted in a simultaneous control input and the go-around procedure being completed out of sequence.
The ATSB analysed:
During the approach to Sydney airport, with the first officer acting as the pilot flying (PF), the flight crew reported experiencing a crosswind of up to 30 kt until descending through about 500 ft above mean sea level. The crew were advised by air traffic control to expect a right crosswind component of 8 kt for landing, which was within the first officer’s operational crosswind limit of 20 kt. The captain confirmed the approach was ‘stable’ at 500 ft and the first officer continued the approach as PF.
At 50 ft, the first officer initiated the flare manoeuvre prior to landing. They recalled they ‘over flared,’ and the aircraft subsequently floated for an extended period along the runway. During this time, the first officer’s control inputs did not counteract the effect of the crosswind, and the aircraft drifted left of the centreline. After observing the lateral deviation from the centreline, the captain commanded the first officer to conduct a go-around.
This occurred just prior to the aircraft touching down when the flight crew would normally be focused on landing. The flight crew did not expect a go-around at the time and had to rapidly shift their focus to conducting the missed approach procedure. The captain recalled being ‘startled’ by the unexpected need to discontinue the landing, however they were more likely experiencing ‘surprise.’ Surprise is a cognitive-emotional response to something unexpected, which results from a mismatch between one’s mental expectations and perceptions (Rivera, Talone, Boesser, Jentsch, & Yeh, 2014). But their decision was consistent with the expectation that an approach be discontinued if the aircraft departed from the correct lateral flight path.
The unexpected change from landing to conducting a go-around close to the ground also resulted in the captain experiencing a sudden stress response at this time. When experiencing acute stress, people can respond quickly to a situation, but without conscious decision-making (Wickens, Helton, Hollands, & Banbury, 2022). After the go-around was commanded, there was a rapid increase in pitch attitude, engine thrust and airspeed, and in response the captain instinctively and inadvertently manipulated their sidestick while the first officer was flying, resulting in a dual-input alert.
The captain reported they only realised they had manipulated their sidestick when they heard the dual input alert. Their primary consideration during the go-around was to avoid an excessive rotation rate to avoid a tail strike, which did not occur. Additionally, operator procedures directed captains to be alert and be positioned to ‘assume immediate control of the aircraft’ during critical phases of flight.
Following the dual input alert, the captain took full control by engaging their sidestick push-button and announced ‘I have control’, and the first officer assumed the role of pilot monitoring. A consequence of the control handover during the initial stages of the go-around was the momentary interruption of sequential crew actions during the go-around procedures. Interruptions typically disrupt the chain of procedure execution so abruptly that pilots turn immediately to the source of the interruption without noting the point where the procedure was suspended (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009).
Additionally, there was a further disruption (rapid task switching) associated with the first officer and captain exchanging pilot flying and pilot monitoring roles. As a result, some of the procedural items were completed out of sequence (flap 3 retraction occurred after gear retraction).
Related Flight:
JQ38,
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