AA5342 - Crash: PSA CRJ7 at Washington on Jan 29th 2025

A PSA Airlines Canadair CRJ-700 on behalf of American Airlines, registration N709PS performing flight AA-5342 from Wichita,KS to Washington National,DC (USA) with 60 passengers and 4 crew, had been on approach to National's runway 01 and was asked by tower whether they could land runway 33, which the crew affirmed, the aircraft was subsequently cleared to land on runway 33. The aircraft was on final approach to National's runway 33 descending through about 200 feet AGL about 0.6nm before the runway threshold when the aircraft collided with a military Sikorsky UH-60 helicopter call sign PAT25 with 3 occupants, both aircraft fell into the Potomac River at 20:46L (01:46Z 30.1.). "Tower, did you see that?" somebody radioed at 01:46:39Z. All subsequent approaches were instructed to go around, departures were halted. All occupants of both aircraft perished as result of the collision.

The airport was closed for the time being.

Tower told aircraft waiting for departures that there had been a collision on finals to runway 33, the airfield was closed and they should return to the apron and shut engines down.

Tower diverted several helicopters in the area following the crash.

A massive rescue operation commenced, with multiple helicopters over the crash site and boats were on scene for search and rescue. Emergency Services stated that due to the current temperatures people would have only about 15-30 minutes until hypothermia sets in and about 30-90 minutes survival time. Emergency Services reported they received an alert from the FAA tower about the crash at 20:48L (01:48Z 30.1.), a state and federal response was initiated involving about 300 personnel.

On Jan 30th 2025 at about 00:30L (05:30Z) local police reported, that fatalities are confirmed, so far no survivors have been rescued.

In a press conference in the morning (US time) of Jan 30th 2025 Officials reported 28 bodies have been recovered so far, and search and rescue operation has been officially turned into a recovery operation. Emergency services do not believe that there are survivors.

Eyewitnesses reported there were suddenly sparks and the aircraft rolled beyond 90 degrees and belly up, possibly about 120 feet above water, and plunged into the water. They could not see a helicopter.

The FAA reported: "A PSA Airlines Bombardier CRJ700 regional jet collided in midair with a Sikorsky H-60 helicopter while on approach to Runway 33 at Reagan Washington National Airport around 9 p.m. local time. PSA was operating as Flight 5342 for American Airlines. It departed from Wichita, Kansas. The FAA and NTSB will investigate. The NTSB will lead the investigation." The FAA subsequently added the airport will remain closed until Friday Jan 31st 2025 05:00L.

The NTSB reported: "NTSB has launched a go-team to the aviation accident involving a PSA Airlines Bombardier CRJ700 airplane and a Sikorsky H-60 military helicopter near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport."

The US Army reported a Blackhawk UH-60 departing Belvoir,VA (USA) for a training mission was involved in the midair collision. According to preliminary information there were 3 people on board of the helicopter.

In a press conference in the afternoon (local Washington time) of Jan 30th 2025 the NTSB reported that the black boxes have not yet been recovered, they are still under water. Being the first day at the accident side, the NTSB indicated they are not going to present any data today as they are still in the process of fetching, verifying and analysing the data. The NTSB reported the helicopter was transitioning from helicopter route 1 to route 4. (end of the press conference)

On Jan 31st 2025 the NTSB announced, that both black boxes (Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder) have been recovered and have already been taken to the NTSB labs for evaluation.

On Jan 31st 2025 the NTSB reported in their press conference, the FDR was recovered in good condition, the NTSB is confident to get a full readout of the device, the CVR had suffered watered intrusion and needs drying and testing before attempting to download. The helicopter has a combined cockpit voice and digital flight datarecorder, this black box has been recovered, too. The box had no exterior damage and the NTSB is highly confident to be able to fully extract the data. A lot more videos showing the collision have been collected. Interviews have been conducted with the air traffic controllers including the one working at the time of the accident and the interview is still going on.

On Feb 1st 2025 the NTSB reported in their 3rd press conference, the CRJ's FDR and CVR were successfully downloaded, the FDR working group is currently analysing the FDR data. The CVR contained 124 minutes of good audio. The recordings have already been synchronised. The crew performed an approach briefing and was cleared for the runway 01 approach, the crew subsequently agreed to runway 33 upon question by the controller. The CRJ crew received a Traffic Advisory. About one second prior to impact the CRJ increased their pitch. A transcript of the ATC communication on all frequencies will hopefully be available tomorrow (Feb 2nd). It is not yet known whether the helicopter crew was using their night goggles. The helicopter black box also suffered water intrusion, however, the NTSB is confident to be able to download the whole recordings. In the occurrence the day before claimed to be a near collision by media the separation never reduced to below 1000 feet vertical. At the time of the crash 5 controllers were active, the tower controller was assisted by an assistance controller, an operations supervisor, an operational supervisor in training and a ground controller. Interviews are being conducted. Currently there is no read out of the helicopter's altitude yet. At the time of impact the CRJ was at 325+/-25 feet MSL, the radar screen of tower showed 200 feet MSL (to be verified and assessed). At the data screen of the controller the altitude of the helicopter at the time of impact showed 200 feet, these data are still being assessed. The NTSB is working to exactly determine the altitude at which the collision occurred. The helicopter was within the assigned route with ceiling of 200 feet MSL. The helicopter was showing 200 feet at the radar screen of tower, the reading however has less fidelity than the FDR data of the CRJ showing the CRJ at 325+/-25 feet MSL.

On Feb 4th 2025 the NTSB announced: "NTSB is not planning any additional on scene media briefings on the Jan. 29 midair collision near DCA. NTSB needs additional information to verify data points from the Black Hawk. In order to obtain this information, the Black Hawk needs to be recovered from the water, which is expected to take place later this week. Any future media briefings will take place at NTSB headquarters." The NTSB indicated however that an investigative update might become available later Feb 4th 2025. In the evening of Feb 4th 2025 the NTSB stated in their investigative update: "NTSB has also been provided updated information that shows the air traffic control tower display at DCA is fed by the Potomac TRACON. The TRACON fuses information from multiple radar sensors and ADS-B data, providing the best quality flight track data to air traffic control. This data showed the Black Hawk was at 300 feet on the air traffic control display at the time of the collision. This data is rounded to the nearest 100 feet. NTSB needs additional information to verify data points from the Black Hawk. In order to obtain this information, the Black Hawk needs to be recovered from the water, which is expected to take place later this week."

On Feb 14th 2025 the NTSB reported the Blackhawk was doing a checkride (the instructor was pilot monitoring), the crew was likely wearing night vision goggles, there is no evidence on the cockpit voice recorder they were not wearing googles. There are no defined boundaries on the helicopter routes despite the blue lines on the then charts. The helicopter was following helicopter route 1, the pilot indicated they were at 300 feet while the instructor said they were at 400 feet - that discrepancy is subject of review. When crossing over the Memorial Bridge the instructor told they were at 300 feet and needed to descend, the pilot replies they were descending. The portion of tower advising the helicopter crew that the CRJ was circling towards runway 33 was not audible on the Blackhawk's crew. 32 seconds before impact the helicopter passed the southern tip of Hains point. 20 seconds prior to impact tower queried the crew whether they had the CRJ in sight, a conflict alert was audible in the background of that transmission. The CRJ crew received an automatic advisory "Traffic! Traffic!" on their TCAS system. 17 seconds before impact tower directed the Blackhawk to pass behind the CRJ. The CVR of the Blackhawk did not have the first portion of the transmission to pass behind, because the helicopter crew were keying their microphone to talk to ATC. The Blackhawk crew reported the traffic in sight and requested visual separation, which was approved. The instructed thought ATC wanted them to turn left towards the east bank of the Potomac. 7 seconds before impact the CRJ rolled out for final on runway 33 at 344 feet. 1 seconds prior to impact the CRH increased pitch reaching 9 degrees nose up with elevators deflected near their maximum nose up range, the aircraft was at 313 feet. The radio altitude of the Blackhawk was at 278 feet at the time of the collision and had been steady for 5 seconds. The radio altitude 278 feet may not be what the crew saw on their barometric altimeters. The NTSB is confident that the helicopter was 278 feet above the Potomac river. The FDR did not record the barometric altitude indicated to the pilots. The altimeter setting was not recorded by the FDR, the FDR also did not record GPS data. The NTSB is facing challenges to determine what altitude was shown to the pilots on the primary flight instruments. Both helicopter and CRJ were on VHF frequencies though different frequencies. The helicopter was capable of transmitting ADS-B Out, however, did not transmit these data out, it is currently not known whether the ADS-B was turned off.

On Mar 11th 2025 the NTSB released their preliminary report and urgent safety recommendations.

The NTSB summarizes the sequence of events:

The following is preliminary information derived from both aircraft’s flight data recorders (FDRs) and cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) as well as ATC radar data and communications. Flight 5342 departed ICT at 1839 EST on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The helicopter flight crew filed a visual flight rules flight plan with DAA base operations and departed at 1845 with the IP in the right seat and the pilot in the left seat. About 2015, flight 5342 started its initial descent. About 2030, PAT25 began travelling generally southbound after maneuvering near Laytonsville, Maryland. CVR audio from the helicopter indicated the IP was the pilot flying and the pilot was the pilot monitoring and transmitting on the radio at this time.

PAT25 first checked in with the DCA tower controller at 2032. The controller issued the altimeter setting of 29.89 inches of mercury, and the PAT25 crew acknowledged by correctly reading back the altimeter setting. Following this initial contact with DCA tower, the crew conducted a change of control; the pilot became the pilot flying and the IP became the pilot monitoring and transmitting on the radio for the remainder of the flight.

At 2033:41, the PAT25 crew requested Helicopter Route 1 to Route 4 to DAA, which the tower controller approved. At 2038:39, the helicopter reached the intersection of the DC Beltway and the Potomac River near Carderock, Maryland. After briefly turning westbound, PAT25 turned back to the east and began descending as it picked up Helicopter Route 1 over the Potomac River southeast toward downtown Washington, DC.

At 2039:10, Potomac Approach cleared the crew of flight 5342, which was inbound to DCA from the south, for the Mount Vernon Visual Runway 1 approach. At 2040:46, the airplane rolled out of a left turn established on the instrument landing system localizer for runway 1, at approximately 4,000 ft pressure altitude, 170 knots (kts), with the landing gear up and flaps extended to 20º.

At 2043:06, the flight 5342 crew made initial contact with DCA tower. At this time, the airplane was about 10.5 nautical miles (nm) from DCA. The tower controller asked if the crew could switch to runway 33. The crew agreed, and the controller subsequently cleared flight 5342 for landing on runway 33. The crew acknowledged and read back the clearance.

At 2043:48, PAT25 was about 1.1 nm west of the Key Bridge. According to the helicopter’s CVR, the pilot indicated that they were at 300 ft. The IP indicated they were at 400 ft. Neither pilot made a comment discussing an altitude discrepancy. At 2044:27, as the helicopter approached Key Bridge, the IP indicated that the helicopter was at 300 ft descending to 200 ft.

The flight 5342 FDR indicated that, between 2044:41 and 2044:45, the crew selected 30º of flaps and then 45º of flaps. At 2044:49, the airplane’s landing gear were down and locked. The airplane was fully configured for landing about 6.2 nm south of the airport. At 2045:27, the autopilot was disconnected and flight 5342 began a shallow right turn off of the runway 1 localizer at a radio altitude of approximately 1,700 ft and an airspeed of 134 kts. This occurred approximately 5 nm south of the airport.

At 2045:14, the crew of PAT25 advised the controller of their position over the Memorial Bridge. At 2045:30, PAT25 passed over the Memorial Bridge. CVR data revealed that the IP told the pilot that they were at 300 ft and needed to descend. The pilot said that they would descend to 200 ft. At 2045:58, the helicopter crossed over the Washington Tidal Basin and followed the Washington Channel consistent with Helicopter Route 1.

At 2046:02, a radio transmission from the tower was audible on flight 5342’s CVR informing PAT25 that traffic just south of the Wilson Bridge was a CRJ (flight 5342) at 1,200 ft circling to runway 33.

CVR data from the helicopter indicated that the portion of the transmission stating the CRJ was “circling” may not have been received by the crew of PAT25. The word “circling” is heard in ATC communications as well as the airplane’s CVR, but not on the helicopter’s CVR.

At 2046:08, the PAT25 crew reported that they had the traffic in sight and requested to maintain visual separation. The controller approved the request. At this time, the distance between the two aircraft was about 6.5 nm.

At 2046:29, the flight 5342 CVR data indicated that the crew received a 1,000-ft automated callout.

At 2046:48, DCA tower cleared other jet traffic on runway 1 for immediate departure with no delay.

At 2047:27, or 32 seconds before impact, PAT25 passed the southern tip of Hains Point.

About one second later, flight 5342 began a left roll to turn to final on runway 33. The airplane was at a radio altitude of 516 ft and 133 kts. At 2047:29, the crew of flight 5342 received a 500-ft automated callout.
At 2047:39, or 20 seconds before impact, a radio transmission from the tower was audible on both CVRs asking the PAT25 crew if the CRJ was in sight. A conflict alert was audible in the background of the ATC radio transmission.
At 2047:40, the crew of flight 5342 received an automated traffic advisory from the airplane’s traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) system stating, “Traffic, Traffic.” At this time, the aircraft were about 0.95 nm apart.

At 2047:42, or 17 seconds before impact, a radio transmission from the tower was audible on both CVRs directing PAT25 to pass behind the CRJ. CVR data from the helicopter indicated that the portion of the transmission that stated “pass behind the” may not have been received by the PAT25 crew, as the transmission was stepped on by a 0.8-second mic key from PAT25.

In response, at 2047:44, the crew of PAT25 indicated that traffic was in sight and requested visual separation, which was approved by DCA tower. CVR data indicated that, following this transmission, the IP told the pilot they believed ATC was asking for the helicopter to move left toward the east bank of the Potomac.

At 2047:52, or 7 seconds before impact, flight 5342 rolled out on final approach for runway 33. The airplane was at a radio altitude of 344 ft and 143 kts.

At 2047:58, or 1 second before impact, flight 5342 began to increase its pitch. FDR data showed the airplane’s elevators were deflected near their maximum nose up travel.

At 2047:58, the controller issued a landing clearance to another airplane. During this transmission, audible reactions could be heard from the other tower controllers as they observed the collision, which occurred about 2047:59 while flight 5342 was over the Potomac River and on final approach for runway 33.

The flight 5342 FDR indicated that the airplane’s last recorded radio altitude was 313 ft, 2 seconds before the collision. The airplane’s pitch at the time of the collision was 9º nose up and roll was 11º left wing down. The airplane was descending at 448 ft per minute.

The PAT25 FDR indicated that the radio altitude of the helicopter at the time of the collision was 278 ft and had been steady for the previous 5 seconds. The helicopter’s pitch at the time of the collision was about 0.5º nose up with a left roll of 1.6º.

The NTSB obtained video recordings from several sources that showed the collision between the aircraft and their descent to the water. A preliminary review of the videos revealed that the airplane's left- and right-wing navigation lights, left-wing, right-wing, and tail anticollision (strobe) lights, nose, right-wing, and left-wing landing lights, as well as the upper and lower beacon lights, were all illuminated before the collision. Further, the helicopter's lower fuselage and aft pylon anticollision (strobe) lights, along with the left, right, and tail pylon position lights, were also illuminated before the collision. None of the airplane’s lights used LED technology.

Video showed that, immediately after the collision, the outboard left wing of the airplane separated, and the airplane rolled about 450°, impacting the water in an approximate 45° nose- low attitude with a left roll about 90°.

The NTSB said in the safety recommendations:

A review of commercial operations at DCA (instrument flight rules departures or arrivals) between October 2021 and December 2024 indicated a total of 944,179 operations. During that time, there were 15,214 occurrences between commercial airplanes and helicopters in which there was a lateral separation distance of less than 1 nm and vertical separation of less than 400 ft. There were 85 recorded events that involved a lateral separation less than 1,500 ft and vertical separation less than 200 ft.

On Jul 22nd 2025 the NTSB announced a three day investigative hearing from Jul 30th 2025 to August 1st 2025, which can be listened to by the public via livestream. The NTSB conducts investigative hearings to assist in obtaining information necessary to determine the facts and circumstances of transportation accidents or incidents under investigation.

On Jul 30th 2025 the NTSB released their investigation docket. The documents show, the helicopter was at 281 feet radar altitude 15 seconds and at 276 feet radar altimeter 5 seconds prior to impact. The CRJ was rolling out at final course at 344 feet radar altitude 67 seconds prior to impact and was at 313 feet radar altitude 2 seconds prior to impact, at that point the crew attempted to pull up the aircraft (pitch increased to +9 degrees) and to turn left, the aircraft was still descending at 448 fpm however. The docket also contains the combined transcript of both tower, CRJ and helicopter. The NTSB also released the History of Flights with the flight tracks, barometric and radar altitudes of both aircraft stating with respect to the helicopter: "The recorded pressure altitude was determined to be unreliable, but radio altitude while the helicopter was over the Potomac River was consistent with the validated CRJ altitudes."

On Jan 28th 2026 the NTSB released their conclusions following a board meeting on Jan 27th 2026 (the final report is to be expected within two weeks):

Probab​​​le Cause

​​​We determined that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA’s placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept.

Also causal was the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a midair collision. Additional causal factors were the tower team’s loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, which resulted in misprioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews. Also causal was the Army’s failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude.

Contributing factors include:

- ​The limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews;

- An unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA ATCT workforce and degraded safety over time;

- The Army’s lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes;

- The FAA’s failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including ADS-B In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risks that were known to management; and

- The absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant organizations.

On Feb 18th 2026 the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA); as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept. Also causal was the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a midair collision. Additional causal factors were the tower team’s loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate realtime operational risk factors, which resulted in misprioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews. Also causal was the Army’s failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude.

Contributing factors include:

- the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews;

- an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time;

- the Army’s lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes;

- the FAA’s failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risks that were known to management; and

- the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant organizations.

The NTSB analysed:

On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time, a Sikorsky UH 60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport Flight 25), and an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers on board the airplane and all 3 crewmembers on board the helicopter died. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident.

Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, Wichita, Kansas, to DCA. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the purpose of the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation flight with the use of night vision goggles. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the time of the accident.

Related NOTAMs:
!DCA 01/745 DCA RWY 15/33 CLSD 2501300150-2501312100
!DCA 01/746 DCA AD AP CLSD 2501300155-2501310400