Created Thursday, Mar 13th 2025 19:16Z, last updated Thursday, Mar 13th 2025 19:16Z
A Ryanair Boeing 737-8 MAX, registration EI-HGG performing flight
FR-2467 from Szczecin (Poland) to London Stansted,EN (UK) with 172 passengers and 6 crew, was on final approach to Stansted's runway 04 when the aircraft became unstable prompting the crew to go around from about 20 feet AGL. The captain, pilot monitoring, took control of the aircraft, the first officer however did not mention that autopilot and autothrust were not engaged. As result the aircraft descended 550 feet before the captain noticed and returned the aircraft back onto the assigned 3000 feet. The aircraft positioned for another approach and landed without further incident.
The UK AAIB released their final bulletin concluding the probable causes of the incident were:
Having levelled off after a GA, the aircraft descended 600 ft from its cleared altitude. This was a result of an incorrect procedure being used during the handover of control and the commander monitoring the co-pilot’s actions, rather than the aircraft.
The AAIB summarized the sequence of events:
The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from Szczecin Airport, Poland to London Stansted Airport. The flight was uneventful until the ILS approach into Stansted, which was flown by the co-pilot. At the time Runway 04 was in use, the weather was fine, and the wind was from 080° at 15 kt.
With the aircraft stable at 500 ft radio altitude, the PF disconnected the autopilot (A/P) and autothrottle (A/T). At about 240 ft the approach became unstable; the IAS was just below VREF and the aircraft was drifting above the glideslope (GS). Despite the PF positively trying to correct the IAS and the GS, the commander felt the aircraft would land deep. As a result, he called “go-around”, which the PF initiated at about 15 ft agl. The go-around (GA) was then manually flown to 3,000 ft amsl, in accordance with the published missed approach procedure (MAP).
Once the aircraft had levelled at 3,000 ft, and before a left turn that was part of the MAP had been initiated, ATC asked the crew the reason for the GA, and if they were happy to make a second approach. At this time the flaps were still extended at Flaps 1. The PM replied that they had “got a bit unstable” and that they were happy to make a second approach. ATC responded by instructing the aircraft to turn left on to a downwind heading. The commander then asked the co-pilot if he wanted to fly the second approach, which he agreed to do. Having discussed who would set up the Flight Management Computer (FMC) for the second approach, the co-pilot said he would.
The commander then declared “i have control” and the co-pilot responded, “you have control”. However, the co-pilot did not state that the A/P and A/T were not engaged. Shortly thereafter, while the aircraft was still in the left turn, the commander noticed that the aircraft was descending and had descended about 550 ft. He promptly took control and climbed the aircraft back to 3,000 ft; the aircraft had descended 600 ft in total during the descent. The A/P and A/T were then engaged, and the commander then elected to fly the approach and landing, which was uneventful. At the time of the level bust the ATCO was co-ordinating the next departure with a colleague and did not notice it.
When the level bust occurred, there was a helicopter that was operating VFR outside controlled airspace at 2,000 ft amsl, that was inbound to Stansted. The helicopter was subsequently cleared to enter the Stansted Controlled Traffic Region (CTR) “not above 2,000 ft amsl”
Related Flight:
FR2467,
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