Created Thursday, Dec 3rd 2020 12:29Z, last updated Friday, Aug 19th 2022 20:04Z
A Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-EBC performing flight
FR-2334 from Malaga,SP (Spain) to Amsterdam (Netherlands), was accelerating for takeoff from Malaga's runway 13.
An Emergency Medical Service Beechcraft B200 was on final approach to runway 13 at the same time and touched down on runway 13.
On Dec 3rd 2020 Spain's CIAIAC reported the horizontal separation between the aircraft reduced to about 0.9nm while the Boeing was still performing the takeoff maneouver. An investigation was opened.
On Aug 19th 2022 the CIAIAC released their final report concluding the probable cause of the incident was:
The investigation has concluded that the incident occurred due to poor landing and take-off planning, which led to an aircraft being cleared to land on a runway already occupied by another on take-off without respecting the minimum separation requirements.
The CIAIAC analysed:
The following factors are considered to have played a decisive role in reducing the separation between the aircraft:
- The air traffic controller’s plan to take advantage of a gap between two aircraft on visual approach to clear the take-off of another aircraft, while the last approaching aircraft was 4.6 NM from the threshold, completing the downwind leg.
- The air traffic controller’s conditional instruction to align the aircraft on take-off when the first approaching aircraft was 2.4 NM from the runway threshold.
- The air traffic controller’s decision to take-off an aircraft lined up on the runway when the aircraft on approach was 2.2 NM away.
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In the incident analysed, the planned take-off window for the RYR7YM traffic was insufficient. Furthermore, the air traffic controller did not take into account the instructions in the LEMG Operating Manual or the aforementioned AESA recommendations. The TWR communicated with ANE8269 and UGC113B in Spanish and RYR7YM in English, which did not help the situational awareness of the crew on take-off. While it’s true that the approaching traffic could see the preceding traffic on take-off, RYR7YM was given no information about the arriving traffic.
...
The moment of minimum separation between the aircraft occurred at 16:17:17 UTC when aircraft RYR7YM was on take-off run at a speed of 90 kt, and aircraft UGC113B was on short final at 130 kt. The horizontal separation between the aircraft was 0.8 NM. Subsequently, when both aircraft were on the runway, the horizontal separation between them was 0.9 NM. According to provision 4.5.10.1.1 of the Air Traffic Regulations, the minimum separation should have been at least the length of the runway in use, i.e., 3,200 m (1.7 NM). Therefore, the separation between the aircraft on the runway was approximately 53% short of the statutory minimum.
...
As established in Royal Decree 1180/2018, which implements the common rules of the air and operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation, in the operational scenario in this incident, which involves aircraft landing with traffic at the holding point and aircraft on take-off with traffic on final, a single language must be used. In this particular case, English was mandatory because there was a non-Spanish-speaking pilot on the frequency.
Therefore, the LCL controller failed to comply with the provisions of Royal Decree 1180/2018 by using the Spanish language with the aircraft on approach and the English language with the aircraft on take-off, which did not favour the situational awareness of the traffic on take-off.
Related Flight:
FR2334,
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