Created Friday, Jul 18th 2025 14:42Z, last updated Thursday, Jul 2nd 2026 18:55Z
A Singapore Airlines Airbus A350-900, registration 9V-SMB performing flight
SQ-832 from Singapore (Singapore) to Shanghai Pudong (China), was descending through FL270 towards Shanghai when the aircraft experienced turbulence causing serious injuries to one occupant. The aircraft continued to Shanghai for a safe landing.
Singapore's AAIB rated the occurrence an accident and opened an investigation.
On Jul 2nd 2026 Singapore's TSIB released their final report reporting a flight attendant received serious injuries and concluded the probable causes of the accident were:
The aircraft commenced descent after receiving an instruction from Shanghai radar control at about 0911hrs. The PIC decided to leave the fasten-seat-belt signs on and made a PA announcement for the passengers to be seated and fasten their seat belts while allowing the cabin crew to continue with their duties.
- Shortly after commencing descent, the flight crew observed that the WXR
display showed widespread weather including two weather cells on their flight path with a clear area between the two weather cells which they could also sight out of the windshield. They assessed both weather cells to be “areas of greatest threat”.
- The PIC decided to navigate the aircraft through the 20NM wide clear path between the two weather cells.
- The aircraft entered a layer of cloud and had to rely on the WXR for navigation.
- When the aircraft exited the layer of cloud, the flight crew realised that the aircraft was very close to the left weather cell requiring the flight crew to initiate a heading change.
- The aircraft encountered turbulence as it descended through 27,500 feet.
The TSIB analysed:
As the aircraft commenced its descent, the detected widespread weather returns became a concern to the flight crew as the left weather cell was in the path of the most likely STAR if ATC had wished to assign the STAR. The flight crew assessed this weather cell and the weather cell to the right of the aircraft’s flight path as “areas of greatest threat”. The PIC considered that circumnavigating the left weather cell would require extensive deviation while circumventing the right weather cell might bring the aircraft beyond the boundary of the Shanghai FIR. Thus, they decided to navigate through an approximately 20NM wide clear path between the left and right weather cells to reach PVG.
The convective weather avoidance techniques stated in the FCTM recommended that any deviation should be performed upwind instead of downwind and that the “area of greatest threat” should be avoided by at least 20NM. Although the flight path that the flight crew decided on would only be at best 10NM clear of the weather cells on either side and downwind of one of the weather cells, it should be noted that these FCTM recommendations are not mandatory but serve as a framework for pilots to use in their decision making.
Thus, it is understandable that the PIC exercised discretion, which is allowed by the FCTM, to achieve a flight path which he assessed to be sufficiently safe and efficient.
The recommendation to maintain at least a 20NM laterally clear of the edge of the “area of greatest threat” is due to the threat of turbulence and wind shear that may extend beyond the edge of the weather cells or visible thunderstorms.
When a pilot decides to exercise his discretion to fly the aircraft with less clearance than that recommended in the FCTM, the probability of a turbulence encounter is increased. Specific to this occurrence, the PIC could have considered additional mitigating measures, such as instructing the cabin crew to be seated, which may have reduced the risk of injury. The flight crew appeared to have decided on navigating through the clear path between the two weather cells by 0913hr as they requested to ATC for a heading change. An instruction to the cabin crew to be seated at this point would have been approximately five minutes before the aircraft arrived in the vicinity of the clear path between the two clouds and reduced the risk of turbulence injury.
Prior to the aircraft entering a layer of cloud, the flight crew was able to use both their vision and WXR to navigate towards the clear path between the two weather cells. However, once the aircraft entered the layer cloud the flight crew could only rely on the WXR for navigation. The WXR limitations mentioned in paragraph 1.8.1.5, might have been what the flight crew experienced which did not allow them to accurately navigate between the two weather cells.
By the time the aircraft exited the layer of cloud and the flight crew could see the external environment, they realised that they were much closer to the left weather cell than expected. The PIC had to initiate a heading change but the aircraft still could not avoid a turbulence encounter.
This occurrence serves as a reminder for the following:
The aircraft onboard WXR has limitations. Pilots should be mindful that the displayed weather information may not accurately represent the external weather conditions, especially during poor visibility conditions where the WXR is the primary source of information and where it is not possible to look outside of the cockpit to cross-check the actual weather conditions.
Pilots should maintain a conservative mindset when dealing with weather. In situations where the FCTM’s recommended distances from the “area of greatest threat” cannot be maintained, pilots should ensure that all passengers and cabin crew are seated with their seatbelt fastened when necessary.
Related Flight:
SQ832,
Singapore Airlines News
