Created Saturday, Oct 1st 2022 16:58Z, last updated Tuesday, Dec 24th 2024 20:07Z
A Transavia France Boeing 737-800, registration F-GZHA performing flight
TO-3943 from Djerba (Tunisia) to Nantes (France) with 160 people on board, landed on Nantes' runway 21 at 13:05L (11:05Z) when both nose tyres were damaged causing the aircraft to roll out on the nose wheel rims. The aircraft vacated the runway and stopped on the taxiway clear of the runway. There were no injuries, the aircraft sustained substantial (structural) damage however.
The BEA opened an investigation.
On Oct 7th 2022 the BEA reported the aircraft received substantial damage to the nose gear, fuselage and engines. The occurrence was rated an accident and is being investigated by the BEA.
On Dec 24th 2024 the BEA released their final report in French only (editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a French only release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe).
Editorial note: The translation of the conclusions of the French report doesn't seem to make sense. As the BEA usually releases an English report in due time, The Aviation Herald is going to wait for the English version before covering the final report.
The BEA summarized the occurrence:
On the descent to Nantes, the co-pilot in line adaptation (AEL) reminded the captain instructor (TRI) of his difficulties with the flare and his apprehension of not reproducing the same type of firm landing as that carried out the day before in Nantes on runway 21. During the briefing, the non-axis approach to runway 21, the profile of this runway ("the hump") as well as the evolution of the weather conditions were discussed by the co-pilot. These threats were not taken up by the instructor. The visual perception caused by the rising part of the runway and the stress linked to the difficulty of landing in Nantes were not the subject of a particular strategy on the part of the instructor to manage them. The choice of the moment when the automatisms would be disconnected was also not discussed at that time.
During the approach, at around 2,500 ft, the co-pilot announced to the instructor that he would disconnect the automatics at an altitude of 2,000 ft, approximately two minutes before reaching the minima. The co-pilot wanted to take advantage of the instructor's presence to fly more manually and regain experience. The instructor was able to let the co-pilot do this to help him regain confidence. However, given the presence of a crosswind, the ceiling close to the minima and the co-pilot's limited recent experience, manual flying probably caused a high workload for the co-pilot.
At 1 NM from the MAPTS and at an altitude of approximately 800 ft, the co-pilot turned to the left to intercept the runway centreline. The approach was stabilized, the co-pilot maintained the glide path following the PAPI instructions and the speed remained close to the reference approach speed. The instructor's correction calls up to very low height show that his attention was focused primarily on maintaining the runway centreline.
After crossing the threshold of runway 21, the aircraft initially flew over the descending section. At a height of between 40 and 30 ft, the co-pilot began to apply nose-up input on the stick to flare, without reducing thrust, but this input was insufficient to change the aircraft's attitude. The aircraft then began to fly over the ascending section of the runway. Between the calls "thirty" and "ten", spaced one second apart and representing approximately 80 m of flight, the co-pilot applied a sharp and rapid nose-up input on the stick, pulling it to more than three-quarter travel, before placing the thrust levers on IDLE. At the same time, the instructor most likely became aware of the delay in the start of the flare and, by reflex, called "attention" to the co-pilot. These sharp and rapid actions at low height above the rising part of the runway did not reduce the aircraft's energy before contact with the runway.
It is very likely that the late flare resulted from an erroneous perception of the final part of the glide path due to the upward slope of the runway and the attention paid mainly until low height by both pilots to maintaining the runway axis.
The influence of the characteristics of the runway, descending then ascending, on the height announcements of the synthetic voice did not help the co-pilot to start the flare and the reduction of thrust sufficiently early given the upward slope before the bump.
Furthermore, the instructor did not consider taking back control during the rounding and most likely did not have time to do so.
The main landing gear touchdown on the uphill section of the runway was hard with a recorded load factor of 2.95 g, at a sink rate of approximately 12 ft/s. The spoilers deployed and the aircraft bounced.
The force of the impact on landing and the rebound surprised both crew members. The instructor reflexively applied a sharp nose-down input to the stick, up to the nose-down stop, which had the effect of rapidly reducing the aircraft's pitch attitude. This reduction in pitch attitude combined with the deployed spoilers led to a rapid reduction in the aircraft's lift. The nose gear and the right main gear simultaneously touched the runway. Under the violence of the impact suffered by the nose gear, both tires were ejected from it, and the aircraft continued the landing by rolling on its rims.
The instructor then maintained the runway centerline while the aircraft decelerated before turning left onto a taxiway to bring the aircraft to a stop and clear the runway.
The fact that the TRI was familiar with Nantes approach 21 and the characteristics of the runway may have minimised:
- his perception of the difficulty that landing on this runway in these conditions could represent for the co-pilot;
- his perception of the risks associated with the apprehensions mentioned by the co-pilot about landings.
The TRI may also have wanted to let the co-pilot do it without adding any additional stress, with a view to restoring the co-pilot's confidence after his period of interruption. The landing made by the co-pilot with a strong crosswind in Djerba may have strengthened the TRI's confidence and led to a drop in vigilance on his part during the approach and landing.
