Created Monday, Jul 31st 2023 18:12Z, last updated Friday, Jan 17th 2025 15:07Z
A United Boeing 767-300, registration N641UA performing flight
UA-702 from Newark,NJ to Houston Intercontinental,TX (USA) with 193 passengers and 9 crew, landed on Houston's runway 26L at 10:34L (15:34Z) but touched down hard. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the apron. There were no injuries.
According to information The Aviation Herald received the aircraft sustained substantial damage including wrinkles in the fuselage.
The FAA reported: "AIRCRAFT MADE A HARD LANDING AND POST FLIGHT INSPECTION REVEALED DAMAGE TO THE FUSELAGE, HOUSTON, TX."
The aircraft is still on the ground in Houston about 50 hours after landing.
On Aug 19th 2023 the NTSB released their preliminary report stating:
The flight crew reported that the first officer (FO) was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. The departure from EWR and the cruise segment of the flight were uneventful. Upon arrival at IAH, they were cleared for the DOOBI2 arrival and the ILS 26L approach. According to the flight crew, the airplane was fully configured for landing, on speed and in compliance with the company’s stable approach criteria and the initial touchdown on the main wheels was normal. The FO stated that after the main landing gear touched down, he held aft pressure on the control yoke to keep the nose wheel from hitting the runway; however, the nose wheel made contact with abnormal force. The airplane appeared to bounce, and he reacted by pulling aft on the control yoke, in an effort to keep the nose wheel from impacting the runway a second time. Subsequently, the speed brakes deployed, and the auto brakes engaged which resulted in a second bounce of the nose wheel. He deployed the thrust reversers, and the airplane began to decelerate. The captain assumed control of the airplane and the remainder of the landing rollout was normal with no risk of runway overrun or excursion.
A preliminary review of the flight data recorder (FDR) revealed that after the initial touchdown on both main wheels, the airplane rolled to the left and right main gear lifted off the runway’s surface. Subsequently, the nose wheel touched down with a gravitational force equivalent (g) of about 1.4 g and bounced. The speed brakes deployed, and the nose wheel impacted the runway a second time with a force of about 1.6 g followed by another bounce. The right thrust reverser (TR) deployed, and the nose wheel impacted the runway again with a force of about 1.6 g followed by the deployment of the left TR.
A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the crown of the upper fuselage.
The NTSB released their final report and investigation docket concluding the probable causes of the accident were:
The first officer’s improper control inputs after the airplane touched down. Contributing to the severity of the damage was the flight crew’s lack of recognition that the speedbrakes were not armed, which led to their delayed deployment.
The NTSB analysed:
After a stabilized approach, the main landing gear of United Airlines flight 702 touched down and the nosewheel contacted the runway harder than expected. The airplane then bounced, and the first officer (the pilot flying) reacted by pulling the control yoke aft to keep the nosewheel from impacting the runway a second time. The first officer applied the thrust reversers, the speed brakes deployed, and the nosewheel bounced a second time.
Subsequently, the nosewheel impacted the runway a third time and, the airplane began to decelerate normally. The abnormal nosewheel impacts with the runway resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage.
Although the first officer stated he held aft pressure on the control column during the initial touchdown, flight data showed that he also made nose-down column inputs during the landing sequence. These nose-down inputs contributed to the nosewheel abnormally impacting the runway.
Normal operation of the speedbrakes includes deployment during initial main gear touchdown, if the speedbrakes are in the armed position and the thrust levers are at idle. The only indication that the speedbrakes are armed is a demarcation line located on the control stand.If they do not automatically deploy during main gear touchdown, the pilot monitoring (in this case, the captain) announces the abnormal operation and slowly raises the speedbrake handle to the up position while the pilot flying slowly lowers the airplane’s nose to the runway. In addition, the speedbrakes will automatically deploy if the airplane is on the ground and either thrust lever is moved to the reverse idle detent.
However, the speedbrakes were not armed before landing and after the airplane’s first bounce, data showed the speedbrakes automatically deployed with the first officer’s application of the thrust reversers, as designed. The deployment of the speedbrakes with the thrust reversers was while the nosewheel was still in the air. This likely contributed to the second abnormal runway contact of the nosewheel and the subsequent damage to the airplane. It is also likely that neither flight crewmember noticed that the speedbrakes were not armed before landing.
Crew Performance
De-rotation is the lowering of the aircraft’s nose gear to the runway following touchdown on the main gear during landing. The first officer’s nose-down column inputs were contrary to United Airlines’ procedures and training. The first officer’s training records showed inconsistencies in airplane handling as recent as a few months before the accident. He received an unsatisfactory performance rating and, upon re-evaluation, a satisfactory rating with a condition to recheck after 90 days (instead of 9 months). This was due to, among other things, marginal performance with landings.
According to the check airman who completed the first officer’s second evaluation, the purpose of the recheck was to ensure, due to the first officer’s previous “struggles,” that his “proficiency is up to standards”. The first officer had accumulated about 129 flight hours in the accident airplane make and model. Due to the satisfactory performance rating on the first officers second evaluation, the investigation was unable to determine if the first officers training inconsistencies contributed to the accident.
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