Created Thursday, Sep 15th 2022 17:26Z, last updated Thursday, Feb 12th 2026 22:11Z
An Air Algerie Boeing 737-800, registration 7T-VKR performing flight
AH-1080 from Oran (Algeria) to Lyon (France), was on final approach to Lyon's runway 17L at 10:18L (08:18Z).
A KLM Cityhopper ERJ-175, registration PH-EXH performing flight KL-1414 from Lyon (France) to Amsterdam (Netherlands), lined up runway 17L for departure and accelerated for takeoff at the same time.
The French BEA reported the separation between the two aircraft on the runway was lost. The occurrence was rated an incident and is being investigated by the BEA.
According to ADS-B Data
AH-1080 touched down in the touch down zone of the runway when the departing KL-1414 just crossed the runway end, there were about 1900 meters/1.03nm between the aircraft at that point.
On Oct 31st 2023 the French BEA released their final report in French only (an English version to be expected in due time) stating as conclusion scenario that the controller had asked the departing Embraer whether they were ready for an immediate takeoff, which the crew affirmed, then the controller cleared the Embraer to line up and wait, however, did not clear for immediate takeoff surprising both the Embraer and Boeing crews. A takeoff clearance was subsequently issued, then the arriving Boeing was told to expect a late landing clearance. The controller cleared the arriving Boeing to land at a height of 60 feet AGL and about 200 meters short of the runway threshold, when the controller observed the nose gear of the Embraer lifting off the runway surface. The Embraer at that point was still 700 meters short of the runway end constituting a loss of separation on the runway as the Embraer should have crossed the runway end already.
The report engages in lengthy conclusions about why guidance for controllers to optimize runway usage is missing despite recommendations released in 2020 by the BEA, but does not seem to state an actual cause of the incident beyond the scenario described above. The actual conclusions together with the analysis will be added when the English version of this final report has been released.
On Feb 12th 2026 the BEA released the English version of the final report concluding:
Contributing factors
The following factors contributed to traffic management decisions that led to the non-observance of the runway separation distance applicable at the time of the event:
- the search for optimisation of air traffic in the absence of working methods for managing traffic on a single mixed-mode runway, more specifically in the absence of means to help the controller ensure that the separation distance would be observed when the arriving aircraft crossed the runway threshold. A recommendation (FRAN-2020-013) was issued in 2020 by the BEA in this regard;
- a lack of assimilation by the controller of the new procedures abolishing reduced separation on runway 17L.
The lack of assimilation of the new standards was probably linked to:
- insufficient support from the DSNA to its local operational centres in implementing regulatory changes;
- insufficient assessment of the impact of regulatory changes on the controllers’ working methods;
- insufficient awareness-raising actions and transmission of information from the SNA-CE to its controllers regarding changes made to operational procedures.
The following factors contributed to the controllers’ late detection of a shorter-than-expected separation distance:
- the LOC controller and her assistant being focused on the A-SMGCS notifications to the detriment of monitoring the progression of the aeroplane on final and of the departing aeroplane;
- a lack of instructions regarding the coordination and distribution of air traffic and A-SMGCS management tasks between the LOC controller and her assistant.
Lastly, the presence of the A-SMGCS did not help to resolve the conflict, while at the same time increasing the controllers’ workload. This was due to inadequate management of the changes arising from the introduction of the A-SMGCS, in particular:
- limited practical training in use of the A-SMGCS (in real-time traffic conditions only) and incomplete operational documentation;
- alert server settings which, on the one hand, did not take into account the abolished reduced separation on runway 17L and, on the other hand, were likely to lead to incorrect awareness of the situation;
- insufficient assessment of the impact of the new system on the controllers’ working methods during the safety study conducted prior to commissioning;
- the absence of restrictions (partial use, limited to certain traffic conditions, etc.) in connection with the commissioning and use of a new system in operational conditions.
Related Flight:
AH1080,
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