FR3418 - Incident: Malta Air B738 at Prestwick

A Malta Air Boeing 737-800 on behalf of Ryanair, registration 9H-QBD performing flight FR-3418 from Pisa (Italy) to Prestwick,SC (UK), was on final approach to Prestwick's runway 20 when the crew went around due to weather. The aircraft entered a hold, then attempted a second approach to runway 20 about 30 minutes after the go around, but again needed to go around. The aircraft again entered a hold, about 10 minutes after entering the hold the crew decided to divert to Edinburgh,SC (UK) where the aircraft joined the final approach to runway 24 about one hour after the first go around but again went around. The aircraft subsequently diverted to Manchester,EN (UK) where the aircraft landed on runway 23R about 110 minutes after the first go around.

On Oct 5th 2025 The Aviation Herald received information that the aircraft landed below minimum fuel with just 220kg fuel (total, 100kg in left and 120 kg in right tank) remaining.

The aircraft returned to service about 13 hours after landing.

On Oct 10th 2025 the AAIB reported the occurrence was rated a serious incident and is being investigated.

A passenger reported after the first go around at Prestwick the crew announced, they would do another attempt to land at Prestwick, then divert to Manchester. Following the second go around the crew however announced they were now diverting to Edinburgh, only after the failed approach to Edinburgh the crew diverted to Manchester.

On Sep 24th 2026 the AAIB released their final bulletin concluding the causes of the serious incident were:

Following two windshear escape manoeuvres at Prestwick caused by the presence of Storm Amy, the crew of 9H-QBD asked ATC if they could divert to Manchester. Although the airport and handling agent policies at Manchester meant that the diversion should have been accepted, a breakdown of communication within the airport led to it being refused. The aircraft diverted instead to Edinburgh where the crew was required to perform another windshear escape manoeuvre.

The pilots were concerned that if they remained at Edinburgh there was a possibility that their low fuel state and the wind conditions could mean they had no option other than to fly through a windshear warning while on approach. They calculated that if they diverted to Manchester, they would land with between 500 and 700 kg of fuel, and, subsequently, the FMS calculated the expected arrival fuel to be 300 kg. Both calculations meant that the aircraft would land below the final reserve fuel of 1,100 kg, but the commander considered the safest option was to divert to Manchester where the aircraft landed with 363 kg.

Following this serious incident, Manchester reiterated to stakeholders its policy for accepting diverting aircraft.

The AAIB analysed:

Summary

9H-QBD departed Pisa for Prestwick but diverted to Edinburgh following two windshear escape manoeuvres at Prestwick. A further windshear escape manoeuvre was performed at Edinburgh after which the crew declared a MAYDAY and diverted to Manchester, where they landed with 363 kg, less than the final reserve fuel of 1,100 kg.

Pre-flight planning

Pre-flight preparations and planning were conducted by each pilot at home prior to the flight. The crew had been informed of the potential disruption due to storm Amy through two communications sent the day before and on the morning of the flight. Extra contingency fuel was carried due to the forecast wind at the destination but the amount of additional fuel was limited by the expectation that an approach to the shorter runway at Prestwick would be required. The additional fuel allowed for about one hour of extra endurance at cruise speed.

Decision-making and emergency handling

Following the first windshear escape manoeuvre at Prestwick, the crew elected to enter the hold and wait to see if another aircraft of the same type landed. They held for about 20 minutes and, when the landing was confirmed, began a second approach. This was in accordance with the operator’s policy that a second approach should only be flown if a commander has reason to believe it will lead to a successful landing.

After the second go-around at Prestwick, the crew asked to divert to Manchester because of the operator’s policy that a third approach is not permitted following two windshear escape manoeuvres, but the request was refused. Although the reason for the refusal was not established, it appeared to have resulted from a breakdown in communication between units within Manchester Airport. According to the airport and handling agent’s policies, the diversion request should have been accepted. The pilots believed that their fuel state did not permit them to declare a fuel emergency, which would have allowed them to go to Manchester. The operator commented that an emergency could have been declared if the crew was concerned that landing at Edinburgh would not have been assured because of windshear. However, the crew based their decision to divert to Edinburgh on a weather report that did not include windshear (although it did report some previous go-arounds) and because Glasgow Airport, although nearer, was experiencing similar weather conditions to Prestwick.

Following the windshear escape manoeuvre at Edinburgh, ATC turned the aircraft north, expecting it to make another approach. The pilots were concerned about the fuel situation but also the possibility of another windshear escape manoeuvre and go-around should they remain at Edinburgh. The Operations Manual states that commanders should only make a second approach following a weather-related go-around if they assess that the second approach will be successful, but the crew appeared concerned that the conditions at Edinburgh did not support such an assessment. Another approach at Edinburgh would have protected final reserve fuel – if it had resulted in a safe landing – but the crew was concerned that if it resulted in another missed approach, they would then be committed to making a third approach in windshear conditions with no option other than to fly through a windshear warning to land.

Prior to declaring the fuel emergency, the pilots had calculated and agreed that they would arrive at Manchester with between 500 and 700 kg of fuel. When they programmed the FMS, however, it predicted arriving at Manchester with 300 kg. Both calculations were below the final reserve fuel of 1,100 kg. The operator’s final reserve fuel policy aims to ensure a safe landing when unforeseen circumstances do not permit the flight to be conducted safely as originally planned, and it is likely that three windshear escape manoeuvres and a diversion would be captured by this definition. The policy also requires commanders to consider ‘a safe landing option’ that preserves final reserve fuel before exploring ‘any landing option’.

The commander considered that if they remained at Edinburgh it could lead to them making an approach with no option other than to fly through any windshear warning to land. In the circumstances, the commander considered a diversion to Manchester to be the safest option even though it would inevitably lead to landing below final reserve fuel.

When the low fuel quantity tank 1 message was displayed, there was an opportunity to review the decision to divert because Edinburgh, although behind them, was closer than Manchester. In the event, the aircraft continued to Manchester where it landed safely, but it is unlikely that there would have been sufficient fuel available for another go-around. The crew had considered Manchester to be their preferred alternate airport from the outset and it is possible that this influenced their decision-making.

Manchester Airport Actions

Following this serious incident, Manchester Airport reiterated to stakeholders its policy of accepting diversion requests if the airport has the capacity to receive the aircraft and that the decision on accepting the diversion does not rest with the handling agent.

Metars Prestwick:
EGPK 032020Z 24031G46KT 9999 BKN034 13/07 Q0979=
EGPK 031950Z 24032G56KT 9999 BKN033 13/07 Q0979=
EGPK 031920Z 24029G48KT 9999 FEW033 SCT043 13/08 Q0979=
EGPK 031850Z 23029G46KT 9999 -RA FEW033 SCT039 BKN047 13/09 Q0978=
EGPK 031820Z 24029G43KT 9999 BKN035 14/08 Q0978=
EGPK 031750Z 24030G47KT 9999 -RA BKN035 15/10 Q0977=
EGPK 031720Z 23031G45KT 9999 FEW012 SCT025 BKN045 16/10 Q0976=
EGPK 031650Z 22034G51KT 9999 FEW012 SCT025 BKN045 17/11 Q0975=
EGPK 031620Z 20033G56KT 9999 FEW012 SCT025 BKN045 18/15 Q0975=
EGPK 031550Z 19035G45KT 4200 RA FEW005 BKN012 17/16 Q0975=
EGPK 031520Z 18030G41KT 5000 -RA FEW005 BKN012 17/15 Q0975=

Metars Edinburgh:
EGPH 032120Z AUTO 24032G45KT 9999 -RA SCT037/// BKN043/// 11/07 Q0976=
EGPH 032050Z 23030G42KT 9999 -RA FEW033 SCT040 BKN049 11/07 Q0976=
EGPH 032020Z 23031G45KT 9999 -RA BKN038 BKN049 12/07 Q0976=
EGPH 031950Z 24033G48KT 9999 -RA SCT034 BKN047 12/08 Q0976=
EGPH 031920Z 24034G52KT 5000 -RA SCT030 SCT034 BKN040 12/09 Q0976 RERA=
EGPH 031850Z 23035G46KT 9999 SCT030 BKN036 BKN040 13/08 Q0976 RERA=
EGPH 031820Z 24035G54KT 9999 RA SCT033 SCT038 BKN045 14/09 Q0975=
EGPH 031750Z 24035G49KT 8000 -RA FEW032 SCT041 BKN048 15/11 Q0975 RERA=
EGPH 031720Z 23035G46KT 5000 RA SCT035 BKN037 BKN046 17/13 Q0973 RERA=
EGPH 031650Z 21024G39KT 9999 VCSH FEW015 SCT025 BKN032 18/15 Q0973 RERA=
EGPH 031620Z 21026G38KT 4000 RA FEW014 SCT027 OVC039 17/15 Q0975=

Metars Manchester:
EGCC 032120Z AUTO 23018KT 9999 //////CB 15/07 Q0991=
EGCC 032050Z AUTO 24020KT 9999 SCT029/// //////CB 16/11 Q0991=
EGCC 032020Z AUTO 23016G29KT 9999 BKN028/// BKN035/// //////CB 17/13 Q0991=
EGCC 031950Z AUTO 23023G34KT 9999 //////CB 17/12 Q0990 TEMPO SHRA BKN012=
COR EGCC 031920Z 24022G37KT 9999 SCT011CB SCT026 18/15 Q0990 RERA TEMPO RA BKN012=
COR EGCC 031850Z 22016KT 8000 +RA BKN013CB BKN023 OVC033 18/17 Q0990 TEMPO RA=
COR EGCC 031820Z AUTO 20011KT 170V240 9999 -RA BKN012/// OVC020/// //////TCU 18/17 Q0990 TEMPO RA=
COR EGCC 031750Z AUTO 20011G22KT 130V230 9999 BKN008/// OVC016/// //////TCU 17/16 Q0990 TEMPO RA=
COR EGCC 031720Z 19012G23KT 140V220 5000 -RA BKN007TCU OVC016 17/16 Q0990 TEMPO RA=
COR EGCC 031650Z AUTO 19011KT 130V230 9999 -RA BKN008/// OVC013/// //////TCU 16/16 Q0991 RERA TEMPO RA=
EGCC 031620Z AUTO 20012G23KT 150V230 2900 +RA BKN007/// OVC017/// //////CB 16/15 Q0991=
COR EGCC 031550Z 18013G25KT 120V230 2800 RA BKN014CB OVC024 17/15 Q0992 TEMPO 6000 SCT014=
COR EGCC 031520Z 19012G22KT 150V230 9999 BKN013TCU BKN025 17/15 Q0993 TEMPO RA=

Related Flight: FR3418, Ryanair News