Created Tuesday, Oct 1st 2024 11:56Z, last updated Tuesday, Jul 28th 2026 12:16Z
A Ryanair Boeing 737-8 MAX, registration EI-IGI performing flight
FR-846 from Barcelona,SP (Spain) to Milan Bergamo (Italy) with 162 passengers and 6 crew, landed on Bergamo's runway 28 but burst a number of main tyres causing damage to all main tyres. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway and was disabled.
According to emergency services the runway was damaged over a distance of 450 meters/1500 feet, too.
Italy's ANSV reported on Oct 3rd 2024: "On Monday 1 October, at 7:55 local time, the Boeing 737 MAX 8-200 aircraft registration EI-IGI, coming from Barcelona, ​​suffered a burst of the 4 tires of the main landing gear during landing at Bergamo Orio al Serio airport. No consequences for the passengers and the crew. The ANSV, which has ordered the opening of a safety investigation into the event, has already acquired, during the operational inspection carried out by its own investigative team, the flight recorders of the aircraft, together with other evidence."
On Jul 28th 2026 Italy's ANSV releeased their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
The serious incident was caused by the MLG wheels locking, due to an incorrect sequence of actions unintentionally applied by the fight crew during landing, occurred with antiskid inoperative.
The delayed deployment of the speedbrakes caused a delayed WOW, the latter with effects on the timely activation of the thrust reversers; the application of the brakes preceded the speedbrakes and the WOW, leading to the blockage of the wheel brakes and consequent damage of both aircraft and runway.
The following contributing factors have been identified:
- The prevalence of automatic responses in procedural memory (motor programme) due to the many landings carried out with the anti-skid system active;
- the crew’s lack of FSTD training in landing with the anti-skid system inoperative;
- the deactivation of both anti-skid channels, despite indications that only the inboard channel was ineffective.
Furthermore, it is thought that the following may also have contributed:
- the discrepancy between the mandatory requirement set out in the AMM and the conditional requirement set out in the MEL regarding the need to disable only anti-skid channels that are faulted;
- the less than adequate evidence in the applicable manuals of a clear and timely sequence of the required actions to perform a landing with the anti-skid system inoperative;
- the differences between the two variants regarding system logic for the deployment of the thrust reversers may have contributed to the PF's prolonged action on the reverses levers and possibly delayed the deployment of the speedbrakes.
The ANSV analysed in part:
FLIGHT OPERATIONS
The flight crew of the B737-MAX aircraft, registration EI-IGI, operating flight FR846, were on their first leg of the day; the prescribed rest periods had been observed.
The scheduled flight, carrying 162 passengers, was also a training flight as part of the FO’s LIFUS training programme, with the captain acting as LT.
The captain accepted the aircraft subject to a MEL procedure, 32-42-01, with both antiskid channels (INBOARD and OUTBOARD) deactivated.
The flight proceeded normally; as the aircraft approached Bergamo Airport, the flight crew prepared to land with the anti-skid system inoperative by conducting a briefing on the limitations and the correct sequence of actions to be taken.
From the CVR recording, it can be understood that the flight crew was fully aware of the implications to land without the anti-skid system, which was in-line with the training they had received and the guidance available to them in the MEL and the QRH.
The crew conducted an ILS approach to runway 28 at Bergamo Airport, maintaining a stable flight profile with correct flight parameters.
The crew received landing clearance at 05:53:20, in almost calm conditions (10°, 2 kt).
Moments before touchdown, as part of the flare, the rate of descent was reduced to a VS of approximately -100 ft/min, until contact with the runway.
The aircraft’s first contact with the runway occurred at 05:54:53, when the radalt reached 0 ft and the vertical acceleration reached its peak. For the purposes of the following analysis, this time will be taken as T0.
At T0 time, the KIAS was 138 kt (VREF + 4 kt) and the GS was 142 kt (VREF + 8 kt), suggesting the presence of a slight tailwind component.
The PF/CPT announces: “Reverse and Speedbrake”, however in the interview stated that he initially had difficulty engaging the thrust reverses.
The AIR/GROUND is not in GROUND condition yet and, although the throttle levers are set to IDLE, the engine thrust is still at APPROACH IDLE.
It is likely that the aircraft was in a state of “ground effect” which prevented the aircraft’s weight from fully pushing down the MLG struts, thereby increasing the landing distance and deceleration time, in absence of any corrective action by the pilot.
At time T0+4.125 seconds, pressure was applied to the right-side brakes, initially reaching 1500 psi and subsequently increasing to 2961 psi (effectively the maximum pressure) by time T0+7.125”.
At T0+4.625 seconds (0.500 seconds after the initial pressure was applied to the right-hand brakes), pressure was applied to the left-hand brakes, initially reaching 700 psi, before increasing to 2940 psi at T0+6.625 seconds.
During this period, the noises caused by vibrations began to be clearly audible in the cockpit; the PF/CPT believed that these might be attributable to a wheel lock.
At T0+7.125 seconds, the start of speedbrake deployment was recorded, coinciding with the WOW signal from the left landing gear.
At T0+8.125 seconds, the ‘Speedbrake/Spoiler’ control lever was recorded as being set to ‘UP’ (corresponding to the actual deployment of the surfaces) and, at the same time, the WOW signal from the right landing gear was recorded, resulting in the system recognizing that the aircraft was on the ground.
Subsequently, the FO/PM announced that the speed brakes had been extended (a check that can only be carried out by observing the position of the speed brake control lever) and that the reversers had been deployed (the ‘REV’ indicator in green above the engine N1 indicators); the PF acted to increase thrust on the reversers.
At the same time, T0+8.125seconds, the release of brake pressure on the right-hand side was recorded.
At T0+8.650 seconds, the WOW signal from the front NLG was recorded.
At T0+9.125 seconds, the start of brake pressure release on the left side was recorded.
At T0+10.125 seconds, the deployment of engine #1 thrust reverse was recorded.
At T0+10.625, the deployment of engine #2 thrust reverse was recorded.
At T0+26.125 seconds, the actuation of the “Speedbrake/Spoiler” control lever in the closing position “DOWN” (indicating the actual closure of the surfaces), was recorded.
At T0+32.125 seconds, the aircraft came to a halt on the runway. At the same time, the retraction of engine #2’s thrust reverser was recorded, followed, at T0+33.125 seconds, by the retraction of engine #1’s thrust reverser.
At T0+37.125 seconds, the TWR reported a probable engine fire.
At T0+43.125 seconds, the crew, having assessed the situation, informed TWR that they had experienced brake problems during landing and therefore requested emergency assistance.
The crew then decided to carry out the necessary procedures and coordination to ensure the safety of the aircraft, the passengers and the emergency services personnel who had arrived at the scene of the serious incident. The aircraft comes to a stop on the runway approximately 1.700 m from the runway threshold and about 1.000 m from the end of the runway.
Finally, the passengers were disembarked using the usual disembarkation procedures and buses.
Related NOTAM:
A8171/24 NOTAMN
Q) LIMM/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A /000/999/4540N00942E005
A) LIME B) 2410010731 C) 2410011200 EST
E) RUNWAY 10/28 AND ALL TWY CLSD DUE TO DAMAGED ACFT.
REF AIP AD 2 LIME 2-1
Related Flight:
FR846,
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